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Inaugurating
the Second
Reconstruction
President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights

Steven R. Goldzwig
My dream is that ... America will come into the full light of the

~ay

when all shall know that she puts human rights above all other rights
and that her flag is the flag not only of America but of humanity.
-Woodrow W ilson

mmediately after World War II, the United States experienced a
heady national ferment to extend the benefits of democracy to
citizens both at home and abroad. Having fought for freedom
abroad, Americans felt renewed vigilance regarding freedom at home.
This was particularly true for the African American veterans. For the
black soldiers who returned to the South, the signs of inequality
and the continuing segregation were particularly galling, and their
persistence was simply unfathomable. Even more ominous was the
record of lynchings that continued to accrue. The vigilante violence
tore at the American promise and made a mockery of American ideals
everywhere. Freedom, equality, and justice might have been espoused
for the many, but they often escaped the experience of the few. Thus,
right after the war, minorities in the United States were particularly

I

susceptible to the chasm between promise and performance, and they
were hard pressed to articulate, much less experience, the tangible
benefits of fighting a world war.
The political climate was also changing. Establishing a vibrant
peacetime economy was an enormous challenge. Pres. Harry S. Truman was vexed by inflation and shortages of goods and services. The
rocky road to conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy
had spelled defeat for the Democrats in the off-year e lections and
did not bode well for Truman's future political viability.
For Harry Truman, the challenge was extraordinary. Absorbing
all Americans into a prosperous postwa r economy was a daunting
task. It seemed particularly overwhelming when Truman turned his
attention to the African American community, where the distorted
face of ongoing violence, segregation, and discrimination was a daily
image in the national mirror.
In 1943, during the FDR administration, the riots in Detroit were
ominous harbingers that not all was well with race relations in the
United States. Truman searched for a way to redress ongoing problems. One of the most enduring actions the president would take in
his attempt to alleviate continuing tensions and abuses in civil rights
was to appoint the President's Committee on Civil Rights (PCCR).
8 The PCCR came to represent an unprecedented move by the executive branch to analyze and redress racial intolerance in the UnHed
States. Not since Reconstruction had the nation's attention been so
focused on race and race relations.
Truman's convocation of the PCCR was not primarily a political
move aimed at winning the 1948 elec~ion (although politics was
never out of the equation), as is sometimes argued, but rather was
convened because of a compleX mix of motivations. Chief among
those concerns wasp~ Truman's sense of justice, constitutional
duty, and the emerging role of civil rights in Cold War diplomacy. By
convening the PCCR, supporting and employing its recommendations in proposing ctvil rights legislation, and speaking publicly on
behalf of a new civil rights agenda, Harry s. Truman distinguished
himself as a proponent of human rights both domestically and internationally. In addition, the pCCR was particularly adept at fashioning
a process and a product that served as a model for an effective attack
on an intractable national problem. At Truman's behest, the PCCR
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opened up a national dia logue on race that set a social, legal, and
moral agenda for the next fifty years.
Truman's Sense of Justice and Constitutional Duty

On September 20, 1946, Harry Truman wrote Attorney General Tom
Clark regarding Issac Woodard, a newly discharged African American
veteran who had been blinded by an attack perpetrated by the local
police. Truman wrote the following: "I have been very much alarmed
at the increased racial feeling all over the country and I am wondering
if it wouldn't be well to appoint a commission to analyze the situation and have a remedy to present to the next Congress-something
similar to the Wickersham Commission on Prohibition. I know you
have been looking into the Tennessee and Georgia lynchings, and
also have been investigating the one in Louisiana, but I think it is
going to take something more than the handling of each individual
case after it happens-it is going to require some sort of policy to
prevent such happenings."• Truman also sent a copy of this letter
to minority affairs assistant David K Niles. His cover memo reads as
follows: "I am very much in earnest on this thing and I'd like very
much to h ave you push it with everything you have." 2
On December 5, 1946, President Truman issued executive order
9808, which announced his appointment of the President's Committee on Civil Rights. 3 In his informal remarks to the new committee
on January 15, 194 7, Truman observed, "You have a vitally important
job. We are none of us entirely familiar with just how far the Federal
Government under the Constitution has a right to go in these civil
rights matters. I want our Bill of Rights implemented in fact. We have
been trying to do this for 150 years. We are making progress, but
we are not making progress fast enough." The president continued:
"I am a believer in the sovereignty of the individual and the local
governments. I don't think the Federal Government ought to be in
a position to exercise dictatorial powers locally; but there are certain
rights under the Constitution of the United States which I think the
Federal Government has a right to protect. It's a big job. Go to it!"4
The tasks Truman had set before the committee were vast and
infinitely complex. The issues were multiple: a presumed need to
reorganize the justice Department; development of codes for efficient
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. .,.. . ...
and effective criminal civil rights enforcement; antilynching legislation; poll-tax legislation; housing covenants; segregation in education, housing, and health care; establishment of a permanent Fair
Employment Practices Commission; minority rights of non-African
Americans-the list went on and on. The president was demanding
proposals that could be sent to Congress immediately. It was a tall
order by any standard.5
Committee members agreed that they would neither engage in
public statements on controversial issues nor make public appearances. This was in conformance with the president's wishes.<> Robert L.
Carr, the executive secretary of the committee, repeatedly maintained
that the report itself would be the closest the committee would get
to reaJ "action" on civil rights matters. It was sometimes hard for the
public and even the committee members to understand this point.
The issues were so pressing and the pain so real that a blue-ribbon
panel could seem nothing more than window dressing. Outsiders
were worried that certain issues would be neglected. There was trepidation that the president's committee wou ld simply conduct business as usual in an effort to fend off substantive progress. However,
as William E. Juhnke observes, "While political considerations were
certainly behind the PCCR project, there is no reason to believe that
the creation of an advisory committee was a cynical political maneuver designed primarily to delay or avoid action." 7 The civil rights
initiatives the committee drafted were always contemplated within a
larger context that had come to include a fierce fight for moral and
ideological s~rity in the newly developed but increasingly long
tentacles ofL wa) diplomacy.
Domestic Civil Rights and National Security
As the United States continued to stake its position in the newly
emerging postwar era, the cornerstone doctrines of th e Cold War
were also in the making. Competition for the hearts and minds of the
world community began in earnest. The United States was determined
to cast international light on its newly defined role as a worldwide
beacon of liberty. As a signatory to the newly formed Charter of the
United Nations, the United States was hoping to attract more nations to the democratic camp. The Soviets, in due course, became the
chief rivals to the United States' vision, and the ideological warfare
86 -
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soon beca me intense. Article 55 of the UN Charter committed the
United States and other signatories to "the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples," and the United Nations as a body
therein committed itself to higher standards of living; full employment; solutions to international economic, soda!, and health-related
problems; and cultu ral and educational cooperation. Moreover, the
signatories pledged "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamenta l freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion."s
1ust as important, "lt] he postwar decolonization movement among
Thiid World peoples put the question of race in an entirely new light,
one that many traditional Americans found unsettling. Decolonization efforts provided Afro-Americans with models of initiative that
challenged existing racial assumptions and jeopardized long-standing
racial arrangements that whites bad taken for granted."9 The global
dimensions of the black civil rights movement had repercussions in
America.
But it was Harry Truman himself who best articulated the new national importance of dvil rights in his landmark address on june 29,
1947, to the NAACP: "Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stand between millions of our dtizens
and their birthright. There is no justifiable reason for discrimination
because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or color." It was now time
for the federal government to "show th.e way," and the president was
emphatic in detailing the grave problem that domestic dvil rights
abuses posed for foreign policy. It was necessary to best our enemies
by a clear demonstration of our tommitment to freedom: "Our case
for democracy should be as strong as we can make it. It should rest
on practical evidence that we have been able to put our own house in
order.... We can no longer afford a leisurely attack upon prejudice
and discrimination." 10
/ke~
The need to "put oux own house in order" did not escape the attention of the State Department. As a July, 1947, State Department
memorandum suggests,
By seizing upon and exaggerating in every way possible such
defects as exist in the observance of human rights in the United
States, the effort is made to destroy the idea of the United States
as the land of freedom .... [Moreover,] [s]ince the moral posiInaugurating the Second Reconstruction -- 87

tion of the United States in the world is based o n respect for
human rights, and since the continued ex istence of totalitarian
regimes depends upon the suppression of huma n rights, this
may be said to be the central issue of present-day world politics.
The United States should not, therefore, take a passive attitude
toward its problems in the field of civil liberties. Even without
aggressive use, this issue forms perhaps the greatest natura l
weapon in the contest and should be recognized and used
wherever the opportunity avails. Similarly, the free institutions
of the United States should be improved and strengthe ned in
every way possible.''

t

With dvil rights abuses in the United States now characterized as
the central issue in world politics, civil rights and Cold War diplomacy
were now inextricably intertwined, and their tangled relationship
was increasingly looked upon as a serious matter. Thus the Cold War
propaganda of the early postwar years recognized the pivotal role of
civil rights in the United States as an important rhetorical platform
in defining the struggle between East and West and between democratic and totalitarian states. The iconic role of the United States as a
beacon of liberty was jeopardized by any report to the contrary, and
it was the multiple contrary reports stemming from reported abuses
in civil rights, especially those emanating from the South, that both
fasctnated and soured the foreign presses from various world capitals.
The United States was smarting under a tarnished image, and it was
most desirous of immediate, long-term image repair. As Mary Dudziak observes, "President Truman and his aides sought change in the
domestic polides and practices that fueled international outrage."' 2
Ironically, the negative foreign press helped the administration
take spedal cognizance of the problem of freedom at home." Attending to civil rights at home for eyes abroad would soon become
the "greatest natural weapon" in the U.S. propaganda arsenal. In
short, the United States could not be the "leader of the free world"
and fix its guiding star while simultaneously trampling the human
rights of her own citizens. To the extent that this occurred, it was a
blemish on the national reputationi at the time, this concern seemed
to eclipse even matters of national conscience. By directing "moral
action" in the civil rights arena as a necessary corollary to winning"
the Cold War, the president, the committee, and the State Depart11

11
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ment fashioned an argument and forged a commitment that would
have complex repercussions for decades to come. 13

"To Secure These Rights"
In his introduction to the final report, Charles E. Wilson states that
11

Civil rights is a national problem. The world is today confused by
differing and often contradictory uses of the language in which free
men express their ideals. It is our hope that our Report will help in
the continuing rededication of our people to the historic principles
which have made us great. We also hope that it will help other nations
to judge our capacity for vigorous self-criticism and improvement
through the normal processes of democracy." 14
Ideological Rationale

The request for action was premised on fundamental moral, economic, and international convictions. Morally, the committee
reasoned, "We need no further justification for a broad and immediate program than the need to reaffirm our faith in the traditional
American morality. The pervasive gap between our aims and what
we actually do is creating a kind of moral dry rot which eats away at
the emotional and rational bases of democratic beliefs." Economically, there was a need for "maximum production and continued
prosperity." Indeed, "A sort of vicious circle is produced. Discrimination depresses the wages and income of minority groups. As a
result, their purchasing power is curtailed and markets are reduced.
Reduced markets result in reduced production. This cuts down employment, which of course means lower wages and still fewer job
opportunities. Rising fear, prejudice, and insecurity aggravate the
very discrimination in employment which sets the vicious circle in
motion." The Separate-but-equal" policy is cited as a cause of lithe
wasteful duplication of many facilities and services." Internationally,
"domestic civil rights shortcomings" were perceived as an "obstacle"
to "mak[ing] the United States an enormous, positive influence for
peace and progress throughout the world." Moreover, the negative
propaganda stemming from civil rights violations and abuses was a
primary impetus to the committee's rationale for action: "We cannot
escape the fact that our civil rights record has been an issue in world
politics. The world's press and radio are full of it. The Committee
11
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has seen a multitude of samples. We and our friends have bee n, a nd
are, stressing our achievement. Those with competing philosophies
have stressed-and are shamelessly distorting-our sh ortcomings.
They have not only tried to create hostility toward us a m o n g specific
nations, races and religious groups. They have tried to prove o ur
democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a con sistent o ppressor
of underprivileged people. This may seem ludicrous to Ameri ca ns,
but it is sufficiently important to worry o ur friends." The ration a le
concludes: "The United States is not so stro ng, the final triumph o f
the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore w h a t the
world thinks of us or our record." 15 With this rationale secure ly in
place, the committee could advance its recommendations.
Recommendations

The final report submitted to the president recommends presidential,
congressional, state, and educational remedies and action. Recommended executive actions include enlargem ent of the civil rights
section ef the Department of Justice, establishment of a sp ecial investigative unit in the FBI specifically for civil rights, establishment
of a permanent commission on civil rights, review of the wartime
evacuation of Japanese American ·citizens, administrative act ion
to eliminate all vestiges of discrimlnation in the armed services,
clarification of loyalty obligations of civil servants, issuance of a
presidential mandate against discrimination in federal employment,
Department of Justice court intervention on restrictive housing covenants, and an executive order directing the Federal Bureau of the
Budget to review all governmental programs for nondiscrimination
policies and actions. This last point reflects the closely contested
sanctions discussion in areas such as education. Twenty-one items
were earmarked for congressional action. Among the most important
were an increase in funding for the Justice Department's civil rights
section; new legislation to supplement Sections S 1 and 52, which
increased fines and penalties for civil rights violations, and Sections
443 and 444, which covered involuntary servitude under Title 18
of the United States Code; a call for an antilynching act; an end to
poll taxes; legislation for ensuring voting rights; legislation on the
aforementioned japanese American evacuees; local self-government
for the District of Columbia; the elimination of segregated housing
through restrictive covenants; modification of laws for naturalized
90 - - CHAPTER 4

citizens; legislation to end segregation in the Panama Canal Zone;
legislation to end discrimination in the military; sanctions on federal grant-in-aid programs for noncompliance with dvil rights law;
a disclosure law covering all groups who sought to influence public
opinion; and the enactment of a Fair Employment Practices Act. Recommendations for state action followed similar directives and were
to be employed at the local level. Action on education included a call
for a publlc-education campaign on dvil rights and one spedfically
targeted at gov,e rnmental employees and the military services. 16

President's Statement upon Receiving the Report
Almost one month after the official due date, on October 29, 1947,
the president received the commUtee's report. He said:
I am going to read this report with great care and I recommend
to all my countrymen that they do the same thing. I created
this Committee witb a feeHng of urgency. No sooner were we
finished with the war than radal and religious intolerance began
to appear and threaten the very things we had just fought for.
I notice that the title of this report ["To Secure These
Rights"] is taken from the Declaration of Independence. I hope
this Committee has given us as broad a document as that-an
American charter of human freedom in our time. The need for
such a charter was never greater than at this moment. Men of
goodwill everywhere are striving, under great difficulties, to
create a world-wide moral order, firmly established in the life
of nations. For us, here in America, a new charter of human
freedom wm be a guide for action; and in the eyes of the world,
it will be a declaration of our renewed faith in the American
goal-the integrity of the individual human being, sustained by
the moral consensus of the whole nation, protected by a governtpent based on equal freedom under just laws. The members of
this Committee are busy men and women. We all owe them a
debt of gratitude. I feel I am speaking for all Americans when
I thank them for their unselfish, devoted serviceY
Reaction to tlhe report was unavoidably mixed. In the North, there
was positive acceptance; in the South, predictable angst and disgust.
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Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Griswold w rote to Robe rt L.
Carr to laud the committee's accomplishment: " J think yo u h ave
done much to educate the public, and it is, in large m easure, o nly
by education, only by bringing about a deep-seated awa re ness of the
problem, that we can make progress in this field. The contributio n of
the rep0rt to that progress seems to me to be as grea t as any which
bas been made in our time." 18 Truman historian and biogra phe r
Alonzo L. Hamby credits the president with spearheading a "bold
and far-reaching document." Hamby asserts, "A half-century la ter,
with those objectives all achieved, it is hard to conceive of jus t how
path-breaking and controversial the report was." 19
On to Civil Rights Legislation

It had bec0me increasingly clear that a host of minority-associated,
civil rights violations and concerns in the n ew postwar era including lynching, violence, voting rights, and fair-employment practices
was sl0wly filling the national cup to the point of overflow. The
committee's report tends to magnify the problem in a particuJarly
graphic way.
Truman's sense of justice, his keen recognition of his constitutional
duty as president, his political instincts stemming from the stunning
1946 off-year election defeat of the Democrats, his anticipation of a
tough, uphill battle for the 1948 campaign, and his desire to deflect
international opprobrium by smoothing the pathways of democratic
propaganda-all coalesced, if not conspired, to convince the president that civil rights legislation was the only real cure. He knew he
needed the South and was fearful of the breakup of the traditional
Southern Democratic coalition. He knew the Dixiecrats might threaten
to break away if he moved forward with his plans. Nevertheless, h e
determined that he could not tum his back on civil rights; this was
a significant, domestic national problem that, in the emerging Truman-doctrine-inspired era, had come to be seen as an impediment
t0 C<:>ld War diplomacy. A civil rights package was necessary to begin
a dialogue that would help circumvent national chaos and preserve
national security. Firm in the conviction that the selection of a morally
righteous path in civil rights would ultimately help the United States
prevail at home and abroad, the president seemed primed to trumpet
his legislative g0al with an unprecedented rhetorical virtuosity.
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State of the Union Address
On january 6, 1948, Truman recorded the following in his diary:
"Congress meets-Too bad too. They'll do nothing but wrangle, pull
phony investigations and generally upset the affairs of the nation.
I'm to address them soon. They won't like that address either."20
Truman was referring to his january 7, 1948, State of the Union
speech. In an election year, the State of the Union message always
receives a bit more attention and perhaps more than the normal fair
share of criticism. This election year was no different, except that
the president's proposals seemed especially out of sync with the
mood on Capitol Hill. Truman also used the occasion to announce
his intentions for dvil rights: "The recent report of the President's
Civil Rights Committee points the way to corrective action by the
Federal Government and by state and Local governments. Because of
the need for effective federal actions, I shall send a spedal message
to Congress on this important subject." ~ 1
For Harry Truman, given his already precarious position in the
public-opinion polls, the negative reaction to this address would
be a clear warning of tough times ahead. 22 If many people were
unimpressed, if not offended, by the president's State of the Union
address, they would be even more distressed by his upcoming speech
to Congress on civil rights. Truman's administrative aides began to
fashion this addr.ess approximately one week after the State of the
Union message.

Preparing the February 2, 1948, Civil Rights Speech
Truman's speechwriter George Elsey asked Milton D. Stewart, chief
researcher and writer on the report for the PCCR and an employee
at the New School for Social Research in New York, and Robert L.
Carr, the PCCR's executive director and professor at Dartmouth's
Department of Government, for their comments as he contemplated
the president's upcoming civil rights message. Since Stewart and
Carr had been the primary writers on the president's report, there
was great interest in their opinion about what the president should
highlight. Stewart observed that a strategy should be drawn up that
was cognizant of the following context: The Republicans, he argued,
have taken up the "poll-tax, anti-lynching, FEPC [Fair Employment
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Practices Commission] refrain." The "Wallace crowd is planning its
major appeal to the urban low-income voter. It is common gossip
here that they are sold on Walter White's view that the Negro vote
will spell victory or defeat in the next election-for the President, at
least." Stewart continued, "There is no doubt in my mind about the
strength of the president's position with minority groups. His stand
on the Palestine question until now, his NAACP speech, the work of
the civil rights committee-all of these add up to a solid backlog of
strength. But it must be finally secured." Stewart advised that what
was needed was "a clear, penetrating image of the president himself
as the unquestioned leader of the nation in the civil rights fie ld. This
is an opportune moment to get it across. The essentia l themes are:
'Everybody else fumbles around; the President knows what to do';
'Everybody else talks and talks; the President acts.' Decisiveness and
determination should keynote the speech. If these assumptions are
true, then the speech should be pointed, straightforward and very
brief." Stewart also advised the president to announce some presidential action as "the clincher." His suggestions included ordering
desegregation of the armed forces within a year, forming an FBI civil
rights squad, ending segregation in the Panama Canal, or some other
immediate executive action that would demonstrate presidential
leadership. All of these recommendations were contained in some
form in the PCCR's report. 23
Carr responded as follows: "The President is confronted with
something of a dilemma: it would be utterly unrealistic of him to
recommend everything that is contained in the Report of the Civil
Rights Committee; on the other hand, he must not disappoint those
people who have had their hopes aroused by the Report. 1 think he
can solve this dilemma by recommending a substantial, but minimum, program for immediate action and then call for further study of
many additional items." Carr added the following: "I think it would
be good psychology to show awareness of the fact that all of our present shortcomings are not due to the lack of legislation, and indicating that he proposes to take action himself immediately whenever
that is within his power." Finally, Carr felt that the president should
perhaps call for "a new statutory 'Bill of Rights"' or, failmg that, at
least stir "popular imagination" by announcing a "unified program,
as opposed to a series of unrelated and piecemeal enactments."z4
In preparing for the address, some of the aaministration's advisers
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were concerned that the president would be condemned not so much
for what he said (although there was some fear there as well) as for
what was left unsaid. Items that the committee ca lled for would look
conspicuous in their absence from the president's speech.
February 2, 1948, Address to a Joint Session
of Congresson Civil Rights
On February 2, 1948, Harry S. Truman made the following entry
into his diary: , I sent the Congress a Civil Rights message. They
no doubt will receive it as coldly as they did my State of the Union
message. But it needs to be said." 25 Indeed, President Truman had
consciously and irretrievably delivered a strong civil rights message
to friends and foes alike. Striking a , dignified and responsible" tone
redolent of his historic NAACP speech, Truman invoked foundational
principles he believed crucial to the American heritage. 26 His litany
included equality; equal justice under the law; equal opportunity
for jobs, ho mes, health, and education; voice in government; and
government protection of the rights of the citizenry. Such ideals,
he argued, had inspired people to come from all over the world to
escape tyranny and join in the blessings of democracy conferred by
the Un ited States. He told Congress, ,Unfortunately, there still are
examples-flagra nt examples-of discrimination which are utterly
contrary to our ideals. Not all groups in our population are free from
the fear of violence. Not all groups are free to live and work where
they please or to improve their conditions of life by their own efforts.
Not all groups enjoy the full privileges of citizenship and participation
in the government under which they live." The president referred
directly to the committee's findings, which had uncovered "a serious
gap between our ideals and some of those practices. This gap must
be closed." Truman argued assiduously that the protection of civil
rights was a duty that obtains for every government "that derives
its power from the consent of the people." Therefore, "[t]he Federal
Government has a clear duty to see that Constitutional guarantees
of individual liberties and of equal protection under the laws are not
denied or abridged anywhere in our Union. That duty is shared by all
three branches of the Government, but it can be fulfilled only if the
Congress enacts modern, comprehensive civil rights laws, adequate
to the needs of the day, and demonstrating our continuing faith in
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the free way of life." Truman then introduced a ten-point legislative
plan that included proposals for the following items: (1) a permanent
commission on civil rights; (2) the strengthening of existing civil
rights statutes; (3) antilynching legislation; (4) the stren gth ening of
voting rights by elimination of the poll tax; (S) establishment of a
permanent FEPC; (6) prohibitions against discriminatio n in interstate-transportation fadlities; (7) home-rule suffrage for residents of
Washington, D.C.; (8) statehood for Hawaii and Alaska; (9) eq ua l
opportunity for naturalized citizens; and (1 0) settlement of the
evacuation claims of japanese Americans.
Truman had made his list shorter than his committee's list, but
this was a practical and a political necessity. The president framed
his legislation as "a minimum program if the Federal Government
is to fulfill its obligation of insuring the Constitutional guarantees
of individual liberties and equal protection under the law." He also
mentioned the executive actions he was undertaking that would put
his own house in order by bringing consistency to nondiscrimination
policy in the federal dvil service and the armed forces.
Finally, Truman, true to earlier form, linked both his present legislative proposals and his own ongoing efforts on behalf of civil rights
through executive action to what he described as the unique "position of the United States in the world today," which made adoption
of these measures "especially urgent." It was important to build "a
world family of nations," and he referred to the UN Commission on
Human Rights, which was at that very hour preparing an in ternational bill of human rights. The president told the American people
that the United States had played a leading role in that endeavor.
"To be effective in these efforts," Truman argued, "we must protect
our dvil rights so that ... we shall be a stronger nation-stFonger
in our leadership, stronger in our moral position, stronger in the
deeper satisfactions of a united citizenry." He concluded on a plaintive note, summoning the mantra of an increasingly familiar, new
Cold War rationale for addressing civil rights: "If we wish to inspire
the peoples 0f the world whose freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish
to restore hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties,
if we wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the
remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy. We know
the way. We need only the will." 27 Truman's speech was audacious
and unprecedented. Never before in the history of the United States
96 --. CHAPTER 4

had any p~fdent d~vered a special message to Congress devoted
entirely t~vil rights.
While Truman set his compass on restoring the moral order in his
defense of civil rights and his call for legislation, not everyone was
pleased with his efforts. Some were puzzled, and others were openly
disdainful. An editorial in The Christian Century offers the following
assessment: "It is hard to know how to treat President Truman's
message to Congress on the protection of civil rights. Considered
simply as a presidential utterance, it is one of the finest in many
years. The President nobly reaffums the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. In striking contrast to
the usual drabness of his literary style, there are several passages in
this document which student orators should be quoting for years to
come. Most of the proposals, also, are just and progressive. However,
it is unhappily probable that by lumping all ten together-making
them, as it were, part of one package-the President has adopted a
legislative strategy which will result in the defeat of all." 28
The South was threatened by the president's message as well as his
civil rights package. In particular, there was fierce anger 0ver Truman's
attempt to overturn the doctrine of white supremacy in the South
by calling for equality in civil rights, jobs, and education. Whites in
the South were reportedly "bitterly opposed" to the president's call
for a Fair Employment Practices Commission. As Truman's blatant
attempt to overturn segregation and undemtine discrimination was
greeted with contempt, some even called for a Dixiecrat revolt. It
was suggested that the Southern governors should mount a march
on Washington. In addition, there was immediate talk of holding a
separate convention to elect a Southern presidential candidate. 29 The
president, however, had his defenders. For example, Walter White
and PCCR member Channing Tobias were eloquent and forceful
apologists for the president's cause.30
The president had raised the ante on civil rights; this divisive issue
posed personal political danger to him and threatened to widen as
much as to narrow the social fissures. As Alonzo L. Hamby observes,
"the political consequences of presidential support for civil rights
were as likely to be negative as positive. In moving as he did Truman followed his best instincts."31 Nonetheless, many at the time
and since then felt those instincts were overly political and perhaps
largely insincere.
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Regardless of the debate over Truman's political motivatio n, the
combination of the distribution of TO Secure These Rights" and
the president's proposed legislation, while certainly controversial,
led to a new dialogue on race in the United States. As David K. Niles
reported to the president, Since the publication of the Committee's
report, daily press coverage has never ceased entirely; but for eight
consecutive days following the Message to Congress, the program
was on the front page, top center, in news, features, editorials, and
cartoons. The minority press has given the Message extens.ive, favorable coverage and comment... . The program as a whole was hailed
as the strongest civil rights program ever put forth by any President.
The message was referred to as the greatest freedom document since
the Emancipation Proclamation. The language of the message was
descril:i>ed as 'Lincolnesque."' Niles reported that every major raclio
network was developing some kind of program highlighting civil
rights issues, that the Voice of America gave the message full coverage, and that a host of state and local activities were in the planning
to solve the civil rights dilemma. One development that had not
been anticipated by the president's committee was the evolution of
municipalities that were beginning to conduct civil rights audits as a
result of the president's counsel. A series of promotional advertising
spots was also developed by the Advertising Council, which had as
its theme "Group Prejudice Is a Postwar Menace." Finally, Niles told
the president that more than 1 million people had already visited the
Freedom Train, which celebrated the American heritage at a number
of whistle-stops across the nation, and that 3-3.5 million people
were expected to visit the train before its run was finished. Before the
Freedom Train's arrival in each town, the municipality would hold
a Rededication Week, which fostered support for national pride and
the celebration of civil liberties. The educational mission that was
presumed as primary by many of the architects of the president's
program got a substantial boost from reports like the one Niles passed
to the president. 32
11
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Truman's Commitment to Civil Rights: Doing What Is Right

President Truman demonstrated presidential character and leadership in commissioning the report, following it up with a direct call
for congressional legislation, and continuing to press for his civil
98 - - CHAPTER 4

rights program both substantively and symbolically throughout
the 1948 campaign and beyond. In all three efforts he maintained
consistency and steadfast resolve. AJthough some have questioned
Harry Truman's commitment to civil rights legislation, I sub~
that his commitment to civil rights was sincere and unequivocal.
While the arguments presented thus far give evidence for this point
of view, I employ this final section of the chapter to reinforce a point
1 believe has been a bit overlooked, that is, the intensity of Truman's
resolve. Such intensity may be somewhat surprising coming from
a man whose grandmother considered herself an unreconstructed
Southerner, whose home state had deddedly Southern sympathies,
and whose own language sometimes contained racist epithets. Harry
Truman, like john F. Kennedy, who would follow him in the lineage
of Democrats who occupied the Oval Office, grew on the job. Both
his constitutional duty and his personal sense of justice seemed to
be at play here.
Before turning to the episodes that speak powerfully to Truman's
resolve, however, I would like to point out that his sincerity in the
area of civil rights can also be deduced by an interesting chronological fact. On july 26, 1948, Truman issued executive orders 9980
and 9981. The former prohibited discrimination in federal employment, and the latter called for the desegregation of the armed forces.
These orders were signed immediately following the divisive 1948
Democratic convention and slightly more than three months prior
to the national election. This action led Ronald Sylvia to conclude
that the president "reacted to events based on his personal belief in
basic fairness and equality" rather than on political expediency.34
Other significant episodes also reveal evidence of Truman's intense feelings on civil rights. When an old friend wrote Truman to
encourage him to "go slow" on civil rights, Truman replied, "I am
going to send you a copy of the report of my Commission [sic] on
Civil Rights and then if you still have that antebellum proslavery
outlook, I'll be thoroughly disappointed in you." The president offered a few personal examples to reinforce the kinds of injustice he
felt his committee was trying to alleviate. The following example is
representative: "On the Louisiana and Arkansas Railway when coal
burning locomotives were used, the [N]egro firemen were the thing
because it was a backbreaking job and a dirty one. As soon as they
turned to oil as a fuel it became customary for people to take shots
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at the [N]egro firemen and a number were murdered because it was
thought that this was now a white-collar job and shou ld go to a w hite
m~. I can't approve of such goings on and I shall never approve it,
as long as I am here, as I told you before. I am going to try to remedy
it and if that ends up in my failure to be reelected, that failure w ill
be in a good cause. "35
Robert Ferrell notes that Truman piomised to mak e a public statement on the abuse of civil rights in the South and that he ke pt his
word by broaching the subject with an integrated audien ce in Da llas, Texas, at Rebel Stadium and by shaking hands with an African
American woman in Waco, Texas, whereupon Truman was summarily
booed for this gesture by the local citizenry. In arguing for equal rights
in the South, Truman stepped forward boldly and courageously.36 This
was an early precursor to Lyndon johnson's advice to John Kennedy
to talk about civil rights to Southerners in their own territory, with
the rationale that even if they did not agree with him, at least he
could gamer their respect for a brave and forthright stand.
Harry Truman's attempt to pass civil rights legislation was tempered not only by Republican and conservative Democratic members
of Congress but also by Truman's legitimate concerns regarding
foreign policy and political timing. In April of 1949, Eben A. Ayers
recorded the following in his diary: "At our staff meeting this morning Clark Clifford brought up the matter of civil rights legislation to
be introduced to the Congress, particularly the timing. The president
said that we could not let anything interfere with U.S. foreign policy
now before Congress-the appropriation of the European Recovery
Program, the Atlantic Pact or treaty, and the reciprocal trade agreement legislation. If civil rights is introduced-and there are four
separate measures contemplated-it will plunge the Congress into
protracted debate and possible filibuster in the Senate by Southerners
who may imperil foreign policy legislation. The president expressed
the belief that [this was] about all that will be accomplished along
the civil rights program this session, but that some of it will be lined
up and some progress will be made." 37 What some may have interpreted as a sure sign of "going slow" on civil rights may have been
interpreted by others as an act of prudence at a critical juncture. At
the least, a careful balance of foreign and domestic policy had to be
entertained.
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man delivered a commencement address at Howard University. He
reflected on his civil rights initiatives: "Back in 1947, a good many
people advised me not to raise this whole question of dvil rights.
They said it would only make things worse. But you can't cure a moral
problem, or a social problem, by ignoring it.... It is no service to the
country to turn away from the hard problems-to ignore injustice
and human suffering. It is simply not the American way of doing
things. Of course, there are always a lot of people whose ·motto is
'Don't rock the boat.' They are so afraid of rocking the boat, that they
stop rowing. We can never get ahead that way.... lf something is
wrong, the thing to do is to dig it out, find out why it is wrong, and
take sensible steps to put it right. We are all Americans together, and
we can solve our hard problems together, including the problem of
race relations. "·111
Truman's finely honed sense of right and wrong, his innate prag- ~
matism, and his ability to rhetorically impart a prindpled vision of
a just democratic society can certainly be adduced in these remarks.
His resolve in the civil rights arena has had lasting implications.
Conclusion

Some people have argued that Harry S. Truman's dvil rights program
was merely a ploy to win the 1948 election. 39 Others have vigorously
maintained that Truman truly felt his constitutional duty to protect
and defend the rights of minority citizens. 40 Still others have come to
the conclusion that Truman had mixed personal and public motives
in this area and that those motives might never be plumbed fully or
satisfactorily. 41 I contend that Truman's intentions were dear from the
outset and that he never wavered. Those motives were precipitated by
his personal outrage at mob violence and his sense of constitutional
duty. Those aims were instantiated in the committee's work, and they
were productive of a most remarkable outcome.
Certainly the pressures on Truman to turn his attention to dvil
rights were many, and a number of them were political, including,
but not limited to, restoration of a thriving postwar economy, the
revamping of a sagging defense establishment, and restoration of
military preparedness in a post-World War II, postdraft era; victory
in the 1948 campaign; compliance with ongoing, international human-rights agreements such as the UN Charter; and an early Cold War
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philosophy. These were perhaps best articulated in the emerging Truman doctrine, which, not without some hubris, demanded that the
United States-as the designated leader of the free world-undertake
an unprecedented, global, democratic experiment, thus launching
what would become known as the American Century.
Perhaps the greatest, tangible civil rights achieve ment of the
Truman administration can be found in President Truman's desegregation of the armed forces. 42 Clearly, Truman was unable to usher
his civil rights legislation to fruition. 43 The president also weakened
his case for civil rights with his government-imposed, civil-service
loyalty program. Nonetheless, I maintain that we must not overlook
the evidence presented here of Truman's own deep commitment to
civil rights and the effectiveness of the PCCR report in sustaining
that commitment. This certainly must temper our evaluations of
Harry S. Truman.
Whatever suspicions we rrtight have of the president's "true" motives, the evidence amassed here underscores Alonzo Hamby's modest
claim that Truman's "civil rights program was a noble resolution of
contradictory impulses," which certainly included a host of concerns,
including those with personal, constitutional, political, economic,
military, and international dimensions. 44 David McCullough evaluatesHarryTruman'saccomplishments in civil rights with the following observation: "He had achieved less in civil rights than he had
hoped, but he had created the epoch-making Commission on Civil
Rights, ordered the desegregation of the armed services and Federal
Civil Service, done more than any president since Lincoln to a waken
the American conscience to the issues of civil rights. " 4 5
Truman's character and leadership set the standard and the tone
for the PCCR. He was responsible for picking the membership, and
he was responsible for their charge. He was responsible, then, for the
committee's success or failure. Although he may have given short
shrift to se>me of its ,recommendations and ignored others, I find the
mere existence of the PCCR a most tangible achievement-one all the
more remarkable for its scope and boldness in its time. Moreover, "To
Secure These Rights" still stands as a major document in the annals
of human rights. 1t was and remains a model of principle and action
in public service, and it would later be emulated by Lyndon johnson when he commissioned the Kerner Commission Report. 416 For it
was Truman's cl.irect charge to his committee and the committee's
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progressive, far-sighted response that became the impetus for the
most indelible series of advances in human rights in the twentieth
century. Long before Brown vs. Board of Education or the boycott in
Montgomery and the modern inauguration of the dvil rights movement in the United States represented by Martin Luther King Jr., the
committee's work was a touchstone in setting off a climate for soda!,
legal, and mora l revolution.
In short, the committee's report set a tone and fostered a climate
that spurred both word s and deeds on race not heard since the
nineteenth century. It spun a chrysalis of dialogue and action in
the United States that not only made government and people vital
but also engaged actors in a nationaJ effort to frame fuller, more
humane lives. It was Harry Truman who reintroduced the nation to
the problem of race, not merely as a divisive dvic problem fraught
with tension, animosity, and political peril or as a vexing Cold War
menace that had created propaganda disaster, but also (and, I believe,
more importa ntly) as a test of high mora l character-one that would
ultimately define the American character. It was Harry Truman who
invited both citizens and government to begin a long, arduous, but
necessary process of educating each other and themselves about
the stakes invo lved in difference, about the meaning of identity,
about how to put a human face on an institution or a society-in
short, about how to achieve equality and justice for all and redeem
America's well- recognized but oft-broken promises. As a result of
the Truman impetus, both proponents and opponents of civil rights
engaged a national debate that continues today and is still shaping
our tomorrows.
Carl M. Brauer credits John F. Kennedy with seeking civil rights
legislation that entreated both Congress and the nation to create what
Brauer calls the Second Reconstruction, which he defines as "a coherent effort by all three branches of the government to secure blacks
their fu ll rights." 47 According to Brauer, this process began with the
famous June 11 , 1963, address. Kennedy did not introduce all of his
legislative proposals on June 11, but he mentioned a few items as he
carefully prepare d the common ground on which all of his proposals
would be based, and he promised he would send a message to Congress the following week. However, I submit that Kennedy's premises
in that address were the same as those of Truman's committee and,
by proxy, of Truman as well. The ideals and the idealism expressed in
Inaugurating the Second Reconstruction ---- I 03

Kennedy's address had a prior establishment. Long before the inroads
paved by john F. Kennedy and the legislation that Lyndon johnson
would finally sign into Law, the key principles had been fashioned.
The blueprint for action was already mightily forged. It was the PCCR
that inaugurated the clear moral, economic, and international principles that sustained the dialogue on and concern over improving
the civil rights of minorities. Truman's efforts on civil rights not only
placed emphasis on race relations in the United States but also firmly
and irretrievably centered better relations as important domestic and
international policy concerns. If, as Brauer argues, "Kennedy both
encouraged and responded to black aspirations and led the nation
into its Second Reconstruction," then it is surely President Truman's
civil rights committee that was responsible for its inauguration.48
In sum, Truman's charge and the PCCR's execution would refocus the nation's attention on minority issues, force the majority to
enlarge its vision, set the social and legislative agenda for the next
half century, and ultimately, I believe, help inaugurate the celebrated
"second reconstruction." We have Harry S. Truman's audacious
leadership and steadfastness to thank for our national invitation to
embark on that momentous journey.
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